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Abstract
Why did evolution not give us a utility function that is o¤spring alone? Why do we
care intrinsically about other outcomes, food, for example, and what determines the
intensity of such preferences? A common view is that such other outcomes enhance
…tness and the intensity of our preference for a given outcome is proportional to its
contribution to …tness. We argue that this view is inaccurate. Speci…cally, we show
that in the presence of informational imperfections, the evolved preference for a given
outcome is determined by the individual’s degree of ignorance regarding its signi…cance. Our model sheds light on imitation and prepared learning, whereby some peer
attitudes are more in‡uential than others. Testable implications of the model include
systematically biased choices in modern times. Most notably, we apply the model to
help explain the demographic transition.
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Introduction

Despite a steady trickle of research on the issue over the last 20 years, it remains unconventional to consider the biological basis of utility or preferences.1 This approach holds out the
promise of generating a utility function with the key economic properties of being exogenous
and invariant. At …rst blush, such a biologically derived utility would value commodities
in accordance with their impact on …tness— we should value food, for example, in terms of
its marginal contribution to biological success. However, on re‡ection, a serious conceptual
problem arises— why have we been made to care about anything other than o¤spring? Why,
that is, if we are rational and intelligent, are we not programmed to like only o¤spring and
then to treat food, for example, as purely instrumental, as a means to an end? In modern
times, indeed, we readily sacri…ce expected o¤spring to increase consumption of other commodities. The recent “demographic transition,” during which incomes rose but fertility fell
is dramatic prima facie evidence on this score.
We consider a solution to this conundrum in terms of information. Our theory has two
key components:
First, the individual has two signals available concerning the state of the world. On the
one hand, there are relevant aspects of the environment that are “recurrent signals” in the
sense of having a long evolutionary history. For example, sunlight has long had an e¤ect in
aiding Vitamin D production and thereby enhancing health and …tness.2 Nature then has
had the opportunity to incorporate a liking for the sun in the utility function. On the other
hand, there are relevant aspects of the environment that are “transient signals”in the sense of
being local in time and space, and having arisen only rarely before, or perhaps never. These
signals might concern likely locations in which to sunbathe, for example. Natural selection
could not have incorporated these aspects of the environment in the utility function.
Secondly, the individual has arbitrary beliefs concerning the implications of the two
signals, but is otherwise rational. In particular, the individual maximizes the expectation
of his utility, conditioning on both the recurrent and transient signals, using these arbitrary
beliefs.
1

Becker (1976) was an early exponent of the need to link economics to biology. More particularly, Robson
(2001b) argues that a utility function serves as a method for Nature to partially decentralize control, thus
achieving a ‡exible response to novelty. There is a distinct literature that considers how preferences that
are not …tness might evolve to yield a …tness advantage in particular games. See, for example, Güth &Yaari
(1992) and Dekel, Ely & Yilankaya (2007).
2
The full importance of Vitamin D was only recently recognized.
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We derive two general results. First, despite Nature’s inability to condition the individual’s utility on the transient signal, and despite the individual’s holding arbitrary beliefs,
Nature can shape the individual’s utility such that the equilibrium action chosen by the
individual is the best possible in the sense of maximizing expected …tness conditional on
both signals. Secondly, the resulting marginal utility of an action is determined not by the
marginal contribution of that action to …tness, but by the individual’s degree of ignorance
regarding such contribution.
Our model sheds new light on the demographic transition. Speci…cally, we argue that
humans have evolved direct concerns for o¤spring quality and for imitation of peer fertility that are evolutionarily suboptimal in modern circumstances. We at once buttress the
approach of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and that of Becker and Lewis (1973).
Our theoretical approach is an instance of the principal-agent problem. In this interpretation, the principal (Nature), maximizes the productivity of the agent (individual) by choosing
the agent’s utility function. Papers that also employ the principal-agent metaphor, explicitly or implicitly, include Binmore (1994), Frederick & Lowenstein (1999), Robson (2001a),
Samuelson (2004), Rayo & Becker (2007), Netzer (2009), and Herold & Netzer (2010). While
the principal-agent perspective is illuminating, there are no formal techniques or results that
can be directly imported from the existing literature.3 In fact, the speci…c principal-agent
problem we consider is not meaningful in conventional economic applications. Most signi…cantly, we assume that (i) the principal has the power to fully shape the agent’s preferences,
(ii) all actions of the agent are contractible in the sense that utility depends directly on the
action, and (iii) the principal has information that cannot be directly communicated to the
agent, despite the parties having parallel interests in the information.
A paper that can be described in analogous terms is Samuelson and Swinkels (2006),
who also consider an environment in which both Nature and the individual possess relevant
information. In an ideal case, the individual would maximize expected …tness. In their
work, unlike ours, there is an emphasis on second-best solutions that provide a rationale for
behavioral biases. We discuss the key issue of why the Samuelson and Swinkels approach
leads to a second-best situation but ours does not in Section 2.1.
Our focus throughout is on “primary”rather than “secondary”arguments of utility. That
is, we consider arguments that are desired as ends in themselves rather than as means to
3

In spirit, ours is a model of delegation. See, for example, Holmstrom (1984), Aghion & Tirole (1997),
Melumad, Mookherjee & Reichelstein (1997), Dessein (2002), Alonso & Matouschek (2008), and Armstrong
& Vickers (2010).
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an end. There are many primary arguments, of course. For example, Linden’s list includes
food, prestige, temperature, a view, and sex (see Linden, 2011). Bentham lists 26 categories
of “simple” pleasures and pains (Bentham, 1789). Perhaps the most salient example of a
secondary argument is money, which is fundamentally only a means to an end from the
perspective of the individual.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the basic model. We dismiss as unrealistic the possibility that the
individual’s beliefs match the true distribution. This leaves us with a mechanism in which
Nature shapes utility in the light of her recurrent information and the individual maximizes
expected utility conditional on arbitrary beliefs. Section 2.1 considers the problem of existence of a utility function that guarantees …rst-best actions. Although existence may be
a delicate issue in a general continuous formulation, it is a straightforward question in a
discrete approximation.
Section 3 reverts to a continuous formulation, while also imposing a monotone structure
on the problem, for concreteness. The main result of the paper is Theorem 1 which proves
that optimal choice can be supported by a utility function that has a simple additive form.
Section 3 intertwines the theoretical argument with two simple but economically relevant
examples. The …rst of these involves choice of labor-leisure; the second involves the quantityquality tradeo¤ for o¤spring.
Section 4 considers how the evolutionary re-shaping of utility would result in systematically ine¢ cient choices in a modern environment, assuming that this environment now
entails accurate beliefs. We propose this observation as the key testable empirical implication of the present model. We use the quantity-quality example to illustrate how ine¢ cient
choices would arise, with an application to the demographic transition that occurred during
the industrial revolution.
Section 5 shows how the present framework can be readily adapted to consider the evolution of interdependent preferences. We show how imitation, a desire for conformity, would
arise. We then focus on a model that is generalized in that it allows an in…nite sequence
of individuals, each observing the action of a predecessor, but simpli…ed in that it assumes
quadratic …tness and normal signals. This model yields insights into the intriguing psycho4

Not all of Bentham’s categories seem clearly primary. For example, he nominates wealth as a simple
pleasure, but then defends this choice in terms of what the money can buy.
Since money is a very familiar means, it induces a rather automatic response. It was once thought that
the fMRI signature of money could not be distinguished from that of sex. However, Sescousse et al. (2010)
show that money and sex have subtly distinct fMRI signatures, re‡ecting the instrumental role of money.
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logical phenomemon of “prepared learning.”In modern circumstances, with accurate beliefs,
there is overimitation, providing support for the analysis by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
(1981) of the demographic transition. Section 5.1 provides an account of the demographic
transition that integrates overimitation with an exaggerated concern with o¤spring quality.
Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2

Model

There are two players: a principal (Nature) and an agent (the individual). The agent faces
a one-shot opportunity to produce …tness y 2 R (representing quality-adjusted o¤spring).

Fitness is a function of the individual’s choice of a vector of actions x 2 RN and an underlying

state

2 R:

y = '(x; ):

The players have only partial knowledge of the state. That knowledge has two components: s 2 R and t 2 R. These components represent, respectively, recurrent and transient

aspects of the environment. The essential distinction is that the utility function given to the
individual can depend on the recurrent component, s; but not on the transient component,
t: From Nature’s point of view, the (“true”) distribution of

conditional on (s; t) is given by

the pdf f ( j s; t); from the individual’s point of view, the (“subjective”) distribution of

conditional on t is given by the pdf g( j s; t): We allow Nature to shape utility in the light
of these pdfs f and g.

A more detailed interpretation of s and t is as follows. On the one hand, s represents
observed aspects of the environment whose implications have remained constant over evolutionary time. For example, s might represent exposure to sunlight. Exposure to UV light,
in particular, aids in the production of Vitamin D, which is essential for health. The pdf f
incorporates the true e¤ect of sunlight on …tness. The individual, however, can be largely or
completely ignorant of this causal chain, having arbitrary beliefs as captured by the pdf g:
The recurrent nature of this causal chain means, however, that Nature can shape the utility
function in the light of s:
The reason we explicitly include the signal s is to allow it to change over time. For
example, if you are warm, cold drinks are helpful; if you are cold, hot. Evolution has
made the appropriate drink seem pleasurable in each circumstance. Kandel et al. (2000)
describe the neurological basis of this phenomenon. In terms of our model, this phenomenon
5

corresponds to allowing utility to depend upon an s that can have a number of possible
realizations that vary over time. The signal s is recurrent, since each of these circumstances
is evolutionarily familiar. This interpretation of a recurrent signal is especially useful in the
model of imitation in Section 5. There, the action of a predecessor has a number of possible
values, but each of these is taken to be evolutionarily familiar, so evolved utility can be made
a function of this action. Although we need the signal s for the sake of generality and to
facilitate extensions of the model, the basic results can be appreciated by suppressing s.
On the other hand, t represents observed aspects of the environment that may be important but have a one-o¤ quality. For instance, a hunter observes the exact position and
strength of his prey, as well as the current abundance of alternative sources of food. By
observing these precise local conditions, in the language of Binmore (1994), the individual
serves as Nature’s “eyes.” We assume that the rarity, or even complete novelty, of such an
aspect means that Nature cannot condition utility on t:
We have assumed that, although Nature cannot make utility dependent on t; Nature
does shape utility in the light of f and g: In what sense is this a plausible assumption? If
t represents completely unrestricted novelty, it is clearly not. For it to be plausible, there
must be a suitable restriction on novelty. Speci…cally, f and g need to be su¢ ciently simple
functions. Consider the following example. Fitness is given by
e¤ort by the individual and

x

(1=2)x2 ; where x is

is the state of the world. The individual receives a signal

t: (For simplicity, we abstract from the signal s:) The true distribution of the state given
t is given by a pdf f with the property that Ef ( jt) = t: It follows that the true optimal

choice of x is x (t) = t: Suppose the individual’s belief concerning the distribution of the
state given t is given by a pdf g with the property that Eg ( jt) = M t where M > 1: That

is, the individual has overly optimistic beliefs about the marginal bene…t of e¤ort. If the
individual maximized …tness in the light of the pdf g, he would expend an excessive level of
e¤ort x^(t) = M t > t: However, the individual can be induced to choose x (t) if the evolved
utility is x

(M=2)x2 : Thus, a simple evolutionarily optimal response to the individual’s

misperception of the state is to have the individual perceive an in‡ated cost of e¤ort. We
analyze a more general version of this example, as Example 1, in Section 3 below. For the
present purpose, the relevant feature is that, although utility here is independent of the
realization of t; the utility construction works for all such realizations.
The model proceeds in three stages:
1. Nature selects a utility function U (x; y; s) for the individual which can depend on the
6

choice, x; realized …tness, y; on the, as yet, undetermined realization of s; but not on
that of t. The goal of the principal is to maximize the agent’s true expected …tness, as
expressed via the pdf f .
2. The signals s; t are realized.
3. The agent learns his utility function U; observes s; t and chooses x: The goal of the
agent is to maximize his expected utility conditional on the information available to
him, as expressed in the pdf g:
4. The state

is drawn and the payo¤s of both players – …tness for the principal and

utility for the agent –are realized.
We interpret this setting as a metaphor for the long-run outcome of an evolutionary
process in which the utility functions of humans are heritable and are the object of natural
selection. Over time, through a trial-and-error process, those individuals endowed with
utility functions that best promote their own …tness dominate the population. Rather than
explicitly modelling such trial-and-error process, we suppose Nature can directly “choose”a
…tness-maximizing utility function for each human being.
From the principal’s perspective, the ideal choice of x solves
max Ef [y j s; t] ;
x

(1)

where Ef means that the expectation is taken with respect to the true pdf f: For simplicity,
we assume that, for each pair (s; t), this problem has a unique solution, denoted x (s; t): If
a function U implements x (s; t) for all (s; t); we say it is optimal.
The individual is fully informed
If the individual is fully informed, so that g = f; his objective is
max Ef [U (x; y; s) j s; t] :
x

A trivially optimal utility function is then
U (y)
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y;

(2)

which perfectly aligns the agent’s objective (2) with the principal’s objective (1).
Such resolution, however, is not a realistic description of humans. Most obviously, perhaps, we do not value only o¤spring intrinsically, viewing sex, for example, purely as an
instrumental means to the end of producing more o¤spring. Less obviously, but perhaps
more convincingly, consider how the experimental results of Wedekind et al. (1995) imply
that our utility functions have arguments other than …tness. These results are that males
with compatible immune systems appear to smell good to women. In the language of Barash
(1979), a pleasant smell produces a “whispering within”that motivates them to select such
mates. This amounts to this smell being an argument of utility. We are not born knowing
that compatibility between parental immune systems is relevant to the …tness of o¤spring,
or with any knowledge about how to check such compatibility.
The individual is not fully informed
When the individual holds arbitrary beliefs g his problem becomes
max Eg [U (x; y; s) j s; t]
x

=

max
x

Z

U (x; y; s)g( j s; t)d ;

where Eg means that the expectation is taken with respect to the subjective pdf g, and where
y = '(x; ). Note that t a¤ects the individual’s decision exclusively though the conditional
distribution of ; whereas s serves also as a parameter of the utility function.
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict attention to this scenario. We will show that
this mechanism is constrained optimal, for hunter-gatherers, so there would have been no
selection pressure for modi…cation.

2.1

First-Best Implementation –Finite Case

In general, a basic theoretical question is whether there exists a function U that depends
only on x; ; and s and that satis…es the integral equation
Z

'(x; )f ( js; t)d =

Z

U (x; ; s)g( js; t)d ;

where the functions '(x; ); f ( js; t) and g( js; t) have been speci…ed exogenously. If y =

'(x; ) were strictly monotonic in ; for each x; then the existence of a function U (x; y; s)
that implements the …tness-maximizing action x (s; t) for all s; t would be a consequence.
8

However, the existence of a solution for U (x; ; s) to such a “Fredholm equation of the …rst
kind”(Hochstadt, 1973) is a delicate issue.5
The choice of a continuous formulation over a discrete one here is mainly a matter of
convenience. Indeed, from a conceptual point of view, a discrete formulation seems unobjectionable. In such a formulation, existence can be readily addressed. Suppose, then, that
and t are restricted to f1; :::; Sg: Given s; the problem is to …nd U (x; ; s) such that
1 S

1 S

S S

S S

X z }| {z }| { X z }| {z }| {
'(x; )f ( js; t) =
U (x; ; s)g( js; t); for all x:
1 S

z }| {
This equation has a unique solution for the row vector U (x; ; s) if and only if the matrix
S S
z }| {
g( js; t) is non-singular, which is a condition that holds generically.6
More generally,

and t might be restricted to …nite sets of di¤erent sizes, f1; :::; Sg and

f1; :::; T g. Perhaps the plausible alternative case is where the number of signals is less than
1 S
z }| {
the number of states, and so S > T . That is, there are more unknowns, as in U (x; ; s); than
S T
z }| {
there are equations, where there is one for each signal, t: If the matrix g( js; t) has full rank,
T , then there is again no problem of existence; rather there is an issue of multiplicity— there
1 S
z }| {
are many solutions for U (x; ; s):
We have then proved a simple but illuminating result—
S T

Proposition 1 Suppose S
1 S
z }| {
for the row vector U (x; ; s).

z }| {
T: If the matrix g( js; t) has full rank, T , there exists a solution

That is, under the stated conditions, there is a utility function that fully compensates
for arbitrary erroneous beliefs on the part of the agent. Hence, despite these beliefs, the
…rst-best evolutionary outcome is attained.
5
6

We are grateful to Phil Reny for suggesting the approach adopted in this section.
Generically, any S S matrix (with non-negative entries) has a nonzero determinant. Now normalize
S S

z }| {
each column by dividing by the sum of the entries in that column to obtain g( jt): This normalization does
not a¤ect the sign of the determinant.
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The approach we take in the remainder of the paper reverts to a continuous formulation,
but sidesteps the issue of existence by imposing additional structure. This structure is mainly
intended to generate a tractable model, and to make available further results, but, as a side
e¤ect, it ensures existence.
Comparison with Samuelson and Swinkels
Proposition 1 provides a good vantage point from which to discuss the relationship of
the current approach to Samuelson and Swinkels (2006). A crucial di¤erence is the general
presumption in Samuelson and Swinkels that the …rst-best evolutionary outcome is beyond
reach, which stands in sharp contrast to Proposition 1. Although the two models have
similar motivations, there are many di¤erences in the details. The key di¤erence seems to
be as follows. In Samuelson and Swinkels, there is a rich signal structure, with signals lying
in [0; 1]2 : There is not a comparable richness in the utility function. This utility function
can be modi…ed by adding a single parameter to encourage one of the two choices that are
available to be favored. This utility function does not provide enough ‡exibility to attain
the …rst-best, given the complexity of the signal structure. However, this ine¢ ciency is less
important for them given their emphasis on providing a foundation for behavioral biases.

3

A Monotone Environment

We revert to seeking an optimal utility function of the form U (x; y; s): We …rst relax the
requirement of matching the functions Ef ('(x; )) and Eg (U (x; y; )) asking only that expected utility be maximized by x (s; t): That is, we require only that,
x (s; t)

arg max
x

Z

'(x; )f ( js; t)d = arg max
x

Z

U (x; y; s)g( js; t)d ; for all s; t:

This relaxation of the restrictions on utility is helpful. It is reasonable as well, since there
would have been be no biological selection that achieved any more.7
Next, we impose assumptions on '; f; and g. These assumptions guarantee that decisions
are “monotone”in the sense that the optimal action is an increasing function of the recurrent
and transient signals.
7

We assume x (s; t) is …nite.
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Assumption 1 i) Fitness '(x; ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave
in x:8
ii) Increasing the state

increases the marginal product of each action: 'xi (x; ) > 0;

for i = 1; :::; N:
iii) Actions are complements in that 'xi xj (x; )

0; for all i; j = 1; :::; N; i 6= j:

Assumption 2 The pdfs f ( js; t) and g( js; t) are continuously di¤erentiable in (s; t) and
strictly increasing, in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, in s and in t:9
These su¢ ce to establish that decisions are monotone—
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, xi (s; t) is di¤erentiable, with
@
x (s; t)
@t i

@
x (s; t)
@s i

> 0; and

> 0, for all i:

Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to illuminate the current approach, we interweave two examples of economic
interest with the development of the theory. The …rst of these concerns the cost of e¤ort.
We consider plausible circumstances under which it would be optimal for evolution to inhibit
e¤ort. At the end of this section, we return to this example, giving there evidence on the
exact biochemical mechanism by which this inhibition is orchestrated.
Example 1 E¤ ort. Suppose x 2 R measures costly e¤ort devoted by the individual to a

given task, and suppose …tness is given by the net success in this task:
'(x; ) = x
where

C(x);

x measures a material output (a function of both e¤ort and the random state

);

and C(x) measures the cost of time and energy in units of …tness, with C(x) increasing and
convex.
Given signals s and t, the …rst-best e¤ort level x (s; t) equates (expected) marginal bene…t
and marginal cost:
Ef [ j s; t] = C 0 (x):
8

Speci…cally, we require that the matrix of second derivatives of '( ; ) is everywhere negative de…nite.
R
Speci…cally, we require that v( ) @f (@sjs;t) d > 0 for all continuous and strictly increasing functions v;
similarly for t:
9
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Assumption 1 is satis…ed, so, under Assumption 2, x (s; t) is increasing in both signals s
and t:
A simple formulation for the cost function C is the familiar quadratic function C(x) =
Ax2 ; which leads to the quadratic …tness function:
'(x; ) = x

Ax2 :

The second of these examples concerns the choice of the quality and quantity of o¤spring.
When we return to this example at the end of this section, we argue that it is plausible that
utility evolved to compensate for the individual’s ignorance of the implications of quality.
In the next section, we develop this application further to illustrate how modern behavior
might be rendered suboptimal by its reliance on such evolved utility. In particular, we apply
the example to help explain the demographic transition as occuring in Europe during the
Industrial Revolution.
Example 2 Quantity versus quality of o¤ spring. Suppose the individual can have any
number of o¤spring she desires, but the quality of each o¤spring is determined by a time
investment. Ignoring integer constraints on the number of o¤spring, let n 2 R+ denote the

individual’s number of o¤spring and let x 2 R+ denote her time investment per o¤spring,

which we assume to be equal across o¤spring. Assuming the individual is endowed with one
unit of time, she faces the budget constraint
n x = 1:
Suppose …tness is given by
n H(x; );
where H denotes the quality of each o¤spring, a function of both the time investment x per
o¤spring and the random state :
Making use of the budget constraint, …tness can be expressed as function of x and
'(x; ) =

H(x; )
x

alone:

h(x; ):

Given signals s and t, the …rst-best time investment x (s; t) equates (expected) average and

12

marginal quality, which is a familiar result in neoclassical production theory:
Ef [hx (x (s; t); ) j s; t] = 0 or Ef

H(x (s; t); )
j s; t = Ef [Hx (x (s; t); ) j s; t] :
x (s; t)

Note that, under Assumptions 1, as applied to h(x; ); and 2, the …rst-best time investment
x (s; t) is increasing (and the optimal number of o¤spring is decreasing) in both signals s
and t:
A simple formulation for the quality function H that satis…es Assumption 1 is the Sshaped function H(x; ) = x2

Ax3 ; which again leads to the quadratic …tness function

'(x; ) =

H(x; )
= x
x

Ax2 :

The Main Result in the Monotone Environment
In order to set the stage for this result, consider an arbitrary x 2 RN : For each s; we

associate to the component xi the value of t 2 R such that the ith component of x (s; t) is
xi :

De…nition 1 Let ti : R

R ! R be such that xi (s; ti (xi ; s))

xi , for all i:

We now demonstrate the existence of a simple utility function which is uniquely maximized at the optimal x:
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, for all s; t the following utility function implements x (s; t)—
U (x; y; s) = y + (x; s):
The “adjustment term” is
(x; s) =

X

i

(xi ; s)

i

where
i

(xi ; s) =

Z

0

xi

Z

'xi (x (s; ti (z; s)); )g( js; ti (z; s))d dz:10

Proof. See Appendix.
10

The lower limit in the outer integral is taken to be 0 to ensure convergence.
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This is the simplest utility function that delivers x (s; t); in that the adjustment term
(x; s) is deterministic (independent of ), additively separable from y; and additively separable across the components of x: Note also that such an adjustment term must depend on
both x and s and thus cannot be further simpli…ed.
Proof in One Dimension
When x is one-dimensional, so N = 1; the individual’s …rst-order condition becomes
Z

'x (x; )g( js; t)d

Z

'x (x (s; t(x; s)); )g( js; t(x; s))d = 0:

Since t(x; s) is the value of t that induces x as the solution to the constrained optimum,
it follows that x (s; t(x; s)) = x. Hence if x = x (s; t) then t(x; s) = t and this …rst-order
condition is satis…ed. Further, if x < x (s; t), then t(x; s) < t: Since g( js; t) is increasing in
R
t in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance, it follows that 'x (x; )g( js; t(x; s))d >
R
'x (x; )g( js; t)d ; so that marginal expected utility of x is positive. Similarly, if x >
x (s; t), then marginal expected utility is negative. Hence x = x (s; t) is the global maximizer
of expected utility.
Sketch of Proof in Two Dimensions
The case in which x is two-dimensional serves to demonstrate the intuitive idea of the
general proof, although the general case is more complex technically. With N = 2; the
…rst-order conditions for maximizing expected utility are
Z

'xi (x; )g( js; t)d =

Z

'xi (x (s; ti (xi ; s)); )g( js; ti (xi ; s))d for i = 1; 2:

As required, these …rst-order conditions are satis…ed by x = x (s; t) since this implies
ti (xi ; s) = t; for i = 1; 2:
Moreover, x = x (s; t) is the unique global maximum. To see why, consider any x 6=

x (s; t): Figure 1 describes the directions in which expected utility unambiguously increases.
These directions can be established by signing the corresponding derivatives. These directions lie in the NE quadrant and the SW quadrant relative to x (s; t): There are two
representative cases to consider. Case i) x

x (s; t): In this case, Figure 2 sketches how

A

it is possible to move from a given such x to x (s; t) in a fashion that increases expected
utility. That is, …rst reduce the coordinate that is too large relative to being on the x (s; )
14

x2

x*( s, t )

x*(s, · )
x1

Figure 1: Directions of utility increase
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Figure 2: Global optimality of x (s; t)
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curve (step 1). Then move along this curve x (s; ) to x (s; t) (step 2). (The case in the SW
quadrant where x

x (s; t) is analogous.) Case ii) x1

x1 (s; t) and x2 < x2 (s; t): Refer

again to Figure 2. Consider a path from a given such xB to x (s; t) that …rst increases xB
2
to x2 (s; t); as in step 3, and then reduces xB
1 to x1 (s; t); as in step 4. Step 4 is a limiting
case from Figure 1 where expected utility must increase, but step 3 is apparently ambiguous. Consider, however, step 3’, where xB
2 increases to x2 (s; t); while holding x1 = x1 (s; t):
Expected utility must increase in step 3’since it is again a limiting case from Figure 1. The
assumption that 'x1 x2 (x; )

0 implies that expected utility must increase by at least as

much in step 3 as it does in step 3’, so it must increase in the two-step process— …rst step 3
and then step 4. The case in which x lies in the NW quadrant is analogous, so the sketch of
the proof is complete.
Observations
Note that this particular decomposition of utility generates a particular trade-o¤ between
y and x; so the individual would sacri…ce expected o¤spring for, say, more food. Furthermore,
this decomposition into y and x is unique, within the additively separable class in which
utility cannot depend directly on , even though y is itself a function of x as y = '(x; ):11
We illustrate the derivation of the adjustment term using Examples 1 and 2:
Example 1 (revisited) Consider now a situation in which the individual’s beliefs, as given
by the pdf g ( js; t) ; strictly …rst order stochastically dominate the true distribution,

as given by the pdf f ( js; t) : It follows that the adjustment term in this case satis…es
x (x; s)

= C 0 (x)

Eg ( js; t(x; s)) < C 0 (x)

Ef ( js; t(x; s)) = 0;

since x = x (s; t(x; s)): That is, the adjustment term acts unambiguously to discourage
e¤ort x. Such a situation might arise after illness, when the immune system is depleted,
but the individual is not fully cognizant of that fact. In this case, the value of s signals
sickness rather than good health. (As health and sickness are recurrent events, utility
11

A measure of the contribution of Nature to the Individual’s decision is
Z
2
'xi (x (s; t); )g( js; t)d
:

This measure is expressed purely in terms of the …tness function and so is independent of the utility
representation. It is a measure of how much the optimal choice of x (s; t) involves “adjusting”the Individual’s
preferences away from expected …tness, generating then derivatives of expected o¤spring that di¤er from zero.
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has been appropriately shaped for either contingency.) It is optimal for there to be less
e¤ort in this circumstance, but the individual must be induced to withdraw e¤ort by
a term in utility. Indeed, it is believed that, after illness, cytokines are released that
inhibit e¤ort, with the individual exhibiting “anhedonia.” Evidence for the inhibitory
role of cytokines comes from experiments that involve injecting cytokines into healthy
rats, which make rats expend less e¤ort for a given reward (see Trivers, 2011). More
generally, it may that the individual perceives a cost of e¤ort that varies with the
task, even though the actual …tness cost of e¤ort is invariant, as may be the case when
comparing walking on a familiar path with walking on a path while visiting a new city.
Example 2 (revisited) It is plausible here that the individual underestimates the importance of quality relative to the importance of quantity. This is because the quantity of
o¤spring is more directly and immediately observable than is their quality, which only
shows up as the quantity of distant descendants. Suppose speci…cally that the individual’s beliefs are distorted, with the distribution given by g ( js; t) being strictly …rst

order stochastically dominated by the true distribution, given by f ( js; t) : Further,

the impact of these distorted beliefs is that the individual underestimates the expected
marginal e¤ect of the time investment x on average quality, h; so that
x (x; s)

=

Z

hx (x; ) g ( js; t(x; s)) d >

Z

hx (x; ) f ( js; t(x; s)) d = 0;

since x = x (s; t(x; s)):12 Now the adjustment term acts to unambiguously encourage
the action x, thereby discouraging quant

ity n and encouraging quality H: We

return to this example in the next section, using it to illuminate how the persistence
of the adjustment term in the modern environment helps explain the demographic
transition.

4

Decisions in the Modern Environment

There are vast di¤erences between the ancestral environment in which our basic preferences
evolved and the present environment. A central, though informal, claim in the literature on
evolutionary psychology is that such di¤erences have led to “misalignments” in our preferences in the sense that we frequently make …tness-reducing choices. Notably, the preference
12

Assumption 1 implies that hxx (x; ) < 0; h (x; ) > 0 and hx (x; ) > 0: We also assume Hx (x; ) > 0:
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misalignments studied thus far belong to a single category: those originating in technological
advances that have increased both the general availability of resources and our control over
reproduction. Common examples cited in the literature include the tendency of modern
humans to consume excessive amounts of sugar and fat and their tendency to use contraceptives. In terms of our model, such misalignments would readily arise upon altering the
individual’s …tness function while holding his beliefs and utility function constant.
In this section, we investigate a di¤erent (and, to our knowledge, novel) category of
preference misalignments: those originating from our improved understanding, relative to our
hunter-gather ancestors, of the link between actions and …tness. In our model, as we illustrate
below, such misalignments arise when changing the individual’s beliefs while holding her
…tness and utility functions constant. Such misalignments generate a set of testable, revealed
preference predictions of the model.
For concreteness, we consider the problem of a perfectly-knowledgeable individual who
understands that the state

is distributed according to f; not g; and is nevertheless endowed

with an “ancestral” utility function.13 In this exercise, to isolate the impact of improved
beliefs, we assume that the …tness function ' is the same for the ancestral and modern
environments.
Speci…cally, consider a monotone environment with N = 1: Moreover, suppose the individual is endowed with the utility function in Theorem 1:
U (x; y; s) = y + (x; s);
where

(x; s) =

RxR
0

'x (z; )g( js; t(z; s))d dz: De…ne xM (s; t) as the solution to the

problem of maximizing expected utility Ef (U (x; y; s)), which uses modern beliefs.

Lemma 2 Impose Assumptions 1 and 2. Fix s and suppose the distribution given by the pdf
f ( j s; t) is FOSD over that given by g( j s; t) (resp. g( j s; t) is FOSD over f ( j s; t))

for all t. Then, assuming that xM (s; t) is …nite, xM (s; t) > x (s; t) (resp. xM (s; t) < x (s; t))
for all t.
Proof. Recall that

Z

'x (x (s; t); )f ( js; t)d = 0 for all s; t:

13

More generally, analogous but reduced e¤ects would arise if beliefs g moved in the direction of f in some
suitable sense.
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Further, for this one dimensional case, since f ( j s; t) dominates g( j s; t);
x (x; s)

=

Z

Z

'x (x; ) g ( js; t(x; s)) d >

'x (x; ) f ( js; t(x; s)) d = 0, for all x; s:

Hence the …rst derivative of modern expected utility becomes:
Z

'x (x; )f ( j s; t)d +

0

(x; s) > 0; for all x

x (s; t):

It follows, as long as a …nite solution exists, that xM (s; t) > x (s; t):14 The proof if g( j s; t)
dominates f ( j s; t) is analogous.

This lemma indicates that when the individual’s ancestors underestimated (overesti-

mated) the marginal …tness value of a given action, this individual will select, once perfectly
informed, an excessively large (small) action relative to its …tness-maximizing level.
Application to the Demographic Transition
The de…ning features of the demographic transition, as experienced in Europe in the
nineteeth century, are usually taken to be—
There is …rst a fall in the mortality rate, often partly due to simple and cheap, but
e¤ective, measures to improve public health and medicine. This fall induces a growth
spurt in the population.
The fertility rate eventually falls, reestablishing a rough balance between the birth and
death rates.
Additional salient features include:
Income rises on average during the transition.
Migration from the country to the city takes place, with a shift away from agriculture
and into manufacturing.
The educational system expands.
14

If a …nite solution is not assumed to exist, it may be that
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R

'x (x; )dF ( j s; t) +

x (x; s)

> 0; for all x:

The basic puzzle that then arises is: Why did fertility fall sharply following a sharp fall
in mortality? That is, given that incomes rose, why would individuals not use the extra
resources to produce more o¤spring?15
We show that Example 2 contributes to an explanation of this puzzle—
Example 2 (revisited once more) We illustrate the results by means of an application
of the model of the quantity and quality of o¤spring to the demographic transition.
Utility including the adjustment term is now
U (x; y; s) = y + (x; s)
where

Z

y = h(x; ) and (x; s) =

x

0

Z

hx (z; ) g ( js; t(z; s)) dzd :

If the individual has correct beliefs in the modern environment, it follows that
Ef (Ux (x; h(x; ); s) =

Z

hx (x; )f ( js; t) d +

x (x; s):

In order to derive the distortion that arises, consider any x that is no greater than the
R
evolutionarily optimal choice, so that x x (s; t): Then, since hx (x; )f ( js; t) d
0; it follows that Ef (Ux (x; h(x; ); s) +

x (x; s)

> 0; for such x

x (s; t): Hence

the individual is induced to increase her investment in the quality of o¤spring beyond
the point of evolutionary optimality, correspondingly lowering the quantity of o¤spring.
Thus a shift towards greater appreciation of the merits of the quality of o¤spring might
lead to an overemphasis on quality, at the expense of quantity. Such an e¤ect could then
help explain a basic puzzle of the demographic transition. That is, if a concomitant of
the transition were greater scienti…c awareness in general and greater awareness of the
consequences of quality in particular, this would lead to an overemphasis on quality,
since preferences were already shaped to encourage quality.
This result is reminiscent of the central …nding in the multitasking agency literature
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). In both cases the agent’s incentive to perform well along
one dimension (quantity, here) has the tendency to crowd out her e¤ort along another dimension (quality, here). In the multitasking literature this result emerges from e¤ort along
15

A compendious detailed reference is Chesnais (1992).
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one dimension being relatively easier to assess by the principal. In contrast, in the present
setting it arises from the agent’s misinformation about the relative value of e¤ort along
each dimension. Another di¤erence vis a vis the multitasking literature is that e¤ort is
fully contractable here, and thus the …rst best is attainable by means of a suitable utility
adjustment.
We return to the demographic transition at the end of the next section, in which we
discuss how imitation might be similarly exaggerated in modern circumstances. In the …nal
section, we return to the demographic transition for the last time, with an integrated model
that incorporates imitation that has similarly recently been exaggerated.

5

Imitation, Prepared Learning and the Demographic
Transition

In the present section, we show how a relative consumption e¤ect can be generated by the
current framework. We achieve this by means of an model that is extended to allow an in…nite
sequence of individuals, each of whom observes the choice of a predecessor, and to allow the
state to evolve. We also make simplifying assumptions— that …tness is quadratic and that the
signals are normally distributed.16 This approach sheds light on an interesting psychological
phenomenon— that of “prepared learning”. In addition, this approach provides a foundation
for the model of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) of the demographic transition.
The distortion created by the inaccuracy of individual beliefs is subtle— it arises from
the individual’s misperception of the informativeness of the transient signal relative to that
of the action of the predecessor. Once utility evolved to make a suitable correction for
these inaccurate beliefs, it would induce overshooting in a modern environment. That is,
individuals might well now imitate too much, to the detriment of evolutionary success.
The key antecedent in this context is Samuelson (2004). The conceptual outline of
Samuelson’s model is similar— he also supposes that the observable but inherently irrelevant
consumption of others conveys information about an unobservable but relevant state. Given
the agent’s defective statistical assessment of the available signals, it is optimal for evolution
to warp the agent’s utility function by including relative consumption. The novelty of our
approach is in providing a biological basis for utility functions in general. Moreover, as
evolutionary explanations for a concern with relative consumption, our models di¤er in their
16

Simple versions of Examples 1 and 2 also entail quadratic …tness and normal signals.
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details, and, more importantly, we provide new applications to prepared learning and to the
demographic transition.
In order to set the stage and to de…ne a suitable notion of “peer e¤ect”, consider two
individuals who choose sequentially, with individual 1 choosing in the light of her transient
signal, t1 ; and individual 2 choosing in the light of his transient signal, t2 and individual
1’s choice, x1 . (We will shortly generalize this model to consider an in…nite sequence of
individuals.) For simplicity, we omit the recurrent signal, s: In the end, the choice of a
previous individual will play a role similar to that once played by s: The transient signals
are independent, so observing x1 is useful to individual 2. Given the appropriate utility
R
function, individual 1 e¤ectively maximizes '(x1 ; )f ( jt1 )d by choosing x1 (t1 ): Given
Assumption 1, a key property is that

dx1 (t1 )
dt1

> 0; so individual 2 can infer t1 from any

possible observed value of x1 : We can then formulate individual 2’s beliefs and choices in
terms of x1 :
Consider now individual 2’s ideal choice, x2 (x1 ; t2 ); given x1 ; and t2 : This is the choice
R
that maximizes '(x2 ; )f^( jx1 ; t2 )d : In this expression, f^ represents the true pdf for

conditional on x1 and t2 : Assume that increases in either of x1 or t2 increase the distribution
for

in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. The problem facing individual 2

remains analogous to that described in detail in Section 4, with x1 playing the role that was
played by s and t2 playing the role of t:
Applying Theorem 1 in this context, it follows that there exists a utility function whose
expectation under individual 2’s beliefs, given by the pdf g( jx1 ; t2 ); is uniquely maximized
by x2 (x1 ; t2 ) of the form

U2 (x2 ; y2 ; x1 ) = y2 + (x2 ; x1 ):
The following captures a “conformity”or “anticonformity”e¤ect—
De…nition 2 De…ne the (marginal) peer e¤ect as
@ 2 (x2 ;x1 )
@x2 @x1

@ 2 (x2 ;x1 )
:
@x2 @x1

If this peer e¤ect is positive—

> 0; an increase in the action taken by individual 1 increases the marginal utility of

the action taken by individual 2, thus spurring an increase in x1 ; and there is a conformity
e¤ect. If this peer e¤ect is negative—

@ 2 (x2 ;x1 )
@x2 @x1

< 0; there is an anticonformity e¤ect .

Extension to Many Individuals
With just two individuals, there must be an asymmetry— one player sees what the other
chooses, but there is no-one for that individual to observe. We turn now an in…nite sequence
22

of individuals, where all of these, except the …rst, will be in a position to observe a choice
made by a predecessor. This example is also richer in that it allows the state to evolve
as a random walk. If there were a …xed state and each individual drew an independent
signal concerning this, the uncertainty concerning the state would disappear in the limit,
conditional on all the signals. The introduction of a state that evolves as a random walk
is also inherently plausible and hence of independent interest. It captures in a stylized
fashion how the climate, for example, might evolve over time and therefore lead to a need
to continuously update choices.
Suppose individuals n = 1; 2; ::: choose in sequence. The state,
is a random walk given by
n = 1; suppose

1

n+1

=

n+"

where "

n+1

n;

a¤ecting individual n;

N (0; v); for v > 0 and n

n+1

1: At

= " 1 : (How the process is initialized is not important in the long run.)

Each individual n gets a transient signal tn =

n

+ "tn ; where "tn

also sees the predecessor’s choice xn 1 . The random variables "

n

N (0; u); and, if n > 1;
and "tn are independent

of each other and over all n. Fitness for each individual n is given by
Suppose xn is the optimal choice for individual n > 1 given xn

1

(

n

xn )2 .

and tn : (We write xn

instead of xn for simplicity. The xn will be characterized below. For n = 1; x1 is optimal
given t1 alone.) Let "xn = xn

n

and let wn = E(

xn )2 = E("xn )2 ; for all n. These

n

denote the error made by individual made by n and its variance, respectively. We can derive
a di¤erence equation for the wn ; given by a function ; and establish the properties of , as
follows:
Lemma 3 In the peer imitation model, wn+1 =

u(v+wn )
u+v+wn

(wn ); for all n: This di¤erence

equation has a unique …xed point w 2 (0; u) such that w = (w ): Further, the di¤erence
equation is stable, with w1 = u and wn # w ; as n ! 1:
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider now the steady state of the above process, which is characterized as follows,
dropping the asterisk from w for simplicity,
xn+1 = ktn+1 + (1
It follows then that
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Indeed,

@k
@u

=

v+w
(u+v+w)2

k)xn , where k =

v+w
:
u+v+w

@k
@k
< 0 and
> 0:17
@u
@v
+

u
@w
(u+v+w)2 @u

and

@k
@v

=

u
(u+v+w)2

23

+

u
@w
(u+v+w)2 @v :

In addition,

@w
@u

=

v
v+2w

>0

Prepared Learning
Consider some relevant results from the psychology literature on prepared learning. Monkeys exhibit neither an inborn fear of snakes nor one of ‡owers. However, they readily learn
to be afraid of snakes if they observe another monkey acting fearfully in the presence of a
snake. It is much more di¢ cult to teach them similarly to be afraid of ‡owers (Cook and
Mineka, 1989, for example).
The model sheds light on these phenomena. Suppose that v; the noisiness of the random
walk describing the state, decreases (or that u; the noisiness of the transient signal, increases).
Since

@k
@v

> 0 (and

@k
@u

< 0) it follows that the weight 1

k put on the previous individual’s

choice increases. That is, individual n + 1 is more responsive to individual n’s choice. It
seems plausible that the evolutionary consequences of snakes have been subject to less drift
over time (or that the evolutionary consequences of snakes are less precisely re‡ected in the
transient signal). This is consistent with the observation that individuals are more in‡uenced
by peer choices concerning snakes than they are by those concerning ‡owers.
Evolved Utility
The above analysis concerns only what is evolutionarily best and has, so far, abstracted
from the beliefs of the individual. Such evolutionarily optimal behavior might be orchestrated despite inaccurate beliefs by means of a suitable utility function. Suppose that the
0
n + "tn

individual’s beliefs are given by a pdf g as follows. The individual believes that tn =
N (0; u0 ) and believes that xn =

where "0tn

true steady state distributions are tn =
so that "xn

"

where

n+1 + n

n +"tn

with "tn

n

N (0; z 0 ). (In contrast, the

N (0; u) and xn =

n+1 +"xn

"

n+1

N (0; z), where z = v + w:) Evolved utility, including the adjustment

n+1

term, is then
U (xn ; yn ; xn 1 ) = yn + (xn ; xn 1 ) =
Indeed,

@Eg U (xn ;yn ;xn
@xn

1)

k0

2
n)

(xn

= 0 at xn = ktn + (1

k
k

k)xn

1

(xn

xn 1 )2 where k 0 =

as is evolutionarily optimal.18 Thus,

because each individual does not see the appropriate relevance of xn
and

@w
@v

=

u w
v+2w

follows from
18
That is,

> 0; since u > w; so that

w = u(v+w)
u+v+w :
@Eg U (xn ;yn ;xn
@xn

1)

=

@k
@u

=

uv
v+2w

(v+w)
(u+v+w)2

2(xn k 0 tn (1 k 0 )xn
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1)

< 0 and
0

z0
:
u0 + z 0

@k
@v

2 k k k (xn xn

1

> 0; since
1)

as a signal of the
uv
v+2w

(v + w) < 0

= 0 at xn = ktn +(1 k)xn

1:

state, they are programmed to treat xn
@ 2 (xn ;xn 1 )
@xn @xn 1

1

as an argument of utility. If k 0 > k, it follows that

> 0 so there is then a conformity e¤ect. If k 0 > k, there is an anticonformity

e¤ect.
Excessive Mimicry
What would happen if the individual became fully aware of the relevance of both signals?
Suppose, that is, that the beliefs g are replaced by the true distribution f , while the utility
function remains the same. The existence of the term (xn ; xn 1 ) in utility now leads to a
distorted outcome. We now have
xn =

k2
tn + (1
k0

k2
)xn 1 :19
k0

It follows that i) If k 0 > k, a fully informed individual would put too much weight on the
actions of another. ii) If k = k 0 ; then there is no distortion. iii) If k 0 < k, then a fully
informed individual puts too little weight on the actions of another.20
If it is accepted as a stylized fact that modern individuals have an intrinsic tendency to
conform, the relevant case is i). Modern individuals would then weight the actions of others
too highly, relative to what would be evolutionarily optimal.
^ n+1 +
This suboptimality can be captured more precisely as follows. We have xn+1 = kt
2
^ n , for k^ = k 0 , implying that xn+1 = n+1 + k"
^ t
^ " xn "
(1 k)x
k)(^
n+1 + (1
n+1 ); where
k
^
^"xn = xn
"xn )2 = w^ be the associated
n is the random error associated with k. Let E (^
steady state error variance. If w is the optimal (minimal) variance, then w < w:
^ 21 (Indeed,
any procedure that combines the two signals tn+1 and xn in a di¤erent linear way than
does the optimal procedure generates strictly lower …tness.) Furthermore, the distortion for
19

This follows since, for this value of xn ;
@Ef U (xn ; yn ; xn
@xn

1)

=

2(xn

ktn

(1

2

k)xn

1)

2

k0

k
k

(xn

xn

1)

= 0:

If k 0 2 [k 2 ; k), then 0 1 kk0 < 1 k; and a fully informed individual puts a weight that is too small,
2
but still non-negative, on the actions of the predecessor. If k 0 < k 2 then 0 > 1 kk0 so the individual places
a negative weight on the action of the predecessor.
21
^ 2 (v + w):
^ 2 (v + w); so that
To prove this, note …rst that w
^ = k^2 u + (1 k)
^ De…ne (w) = w k^2 u + (1 k)
^ 2 > 0: It is easily shown that k 2 u + (1 k)2 (v + w) is minimized by choice
(w)
^ = 0; and 0 (w) = 1 (1 k)
v+w
^ 2 (v + w ) < w
of k = u+v+w : It follows then that (w ) = w
k^2 u + (1 k)
k 2 u + (1 k)2 (v + w ) = 0;
so w < w,
^ as claimed.
20

25

modern choices induced in this way can be relatively arbitrarily large.22

5.1

The Demographic Transition

We now apply the imitation model of the current section to add an important component to
our treatment of the demographic transition. The imitation model already supports the approach of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981). They assume that individuals have an intrinsic
interest in mimicking the fertility decisions of others and that the cultural transmission of
reduced fertility might outweigh natural selection in favor of maintaining high fertility. Our
imitation model illustrates how such an interest in mimicry might have evolved. It then
shows how a plausible shift in circumstances (better informed individuals) will indeed lead
to mimicry being excessive relative to the evolutionary optimum.
We now blend our imitation model with Example 2. For this purpose, we assume that
the choice, x; in the imitation model represents the time investment in the quality of each
o¤spring. We also assume that …tness is quadratic. Note that assuming that '(x; ) =

(

x)2 is operationally equivalent to assuming it is of the form '(x; ) = h(x; ) = x

Ax2 ,

as in the simple case of Example 2.23 In the imitation model, there are two signals available
to the individual— the contemporaneous transient signal and the action of the predecessor.
Suppose now that each individual has beliefs that are erroneous not merely because she
misestimates the relative precision of the two signals, but because she underestimates the
mean of the state given either signal, as in Example 2 (“ revisited once more”). That is, the
individual’s beliefs, g, are now given as:
tn =

n

+ c + "0tn , where "0tn

N (0; u0 ) and xn =

n+1

+d+

n

where

N (0; z 0 ):

n

All other elements of the imitation model remain as before. The relative precision of the
predecessor’s choice is underestimated, so that k 0 =

z0
u0 +z 0

>k=

z
:
u+z

To capture the under-

estimation of the state given the signals, we further assume that c; d > 0:
v+w
To prove this, consider the limit as v ! 0: From w = u(v+w)
u+v+w and k = u+v+w ; it follows that both w ! 0
2
^ 2 (v + w);
and k ! 0: If k 0 > 0 is …xed, then k^ = kk0 ! 0 as well. From w
^ = k^2 u + (1 k)
^ it follows that
22

w
^=

^
ku
^
2 k

+

^ 2v
(1 k)
u(v+w)
^ k
^ : Using w = u+v+w and w = ku; it
(2 k)
uk0
2 > 0; but w ! 0, as v ! 0;as claimed.
x2
2
(
x)2 =
+ 2x
x2 = 2(x
2 )

Hence w
^!
23
Indeed,
has no e¤ect on the optimal choice, x:
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follows that 1 =
2

u

v
k2

+ k; so that

: Although the term

2

v
k2

! u as v ! 0:

varies with the pdf, it

In the ancient steady state, evolved utility of the form
U (xn ; yn ; xn 1 ) = yn + (xn ; xn 1 ) =

k0

2
n)

(xn

k
k

xn 1 )2 +2 (k 0 c + (1

(xn

k 0 )d) xn

would have generated evolutionary optimality.24
Consider now the modern distorted choice that arises with this utility function, but with
the correct beliefs, f: From the …rst-order condition
xn =

k2
tn + (1
k0

k2
)xn
k0

1+

@Ef U (xn ;yn ;xn
@xn

1)

= 0; it follows that

(k 0 c + (1 k 0 )d) k
:
k0

We now derive the increased variance associated with this choice of xn : The e¤ect of
underestimating of the mean of the state is to add a new term to this variance. Fomally, let
xn

n

=m
^ and E (xn
m)
^ 2 = w:
^ It
n
^ 2 (v + w),
and the equation that determines w^ is w^ = k^2 u + (1 k)
^

= ^"xn ; in the steady state. Suppose E (xn

follows that m
^ =

k0 c+(1 k0 )d
k
25

as above when c = d = 0:

n)

Finally, we have that E (xn

n)

2

= w^ + (m)
^ 2 , as claimed.

Combined Impact of Evolved Concerns for Imitation and for O¤spring Quality
To summarize: Not only does the individual place too much weight on the choice of the
predecessor, but she also uniformly increases her own choice. The …rst e¤ect causes the
variance of the choice to be too high, and so lowers …tness. The second e¤ect independently
raises the mean of the choice and therefore also raises the variance and further lowers …tness.
The central mystery of the demographic transition concerns the fall in fertility that
occurred despite, or because of, a rise in income. This juxtaposition is puzzling even from an
economic point of view, but it can be resolved by supposing a suitably high level of concern
with the quality of o¤spring (see Becker and Lewis, 1973, for example). This juxtaposition
is still more challenging to explain as evolutionarily optimal.
24

To see why, note that the …rst-order condition

@Eg U (xn ; yn ; xn
@xn

1)

=

2(xn

k 0 tn

2(1

k 0 )xn

k0

)

1

k
k

(xn

xn

1)

+ 2(k 0 c + (1

implies xn = ktn + (1 k)xn 1 :
25
These results follow from the steady state relationship
xn =
where k^ =

n

^ t + (1
+ k"
n

^ "x
k)(^
n

1

k2
k0 :
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"

n

)+

(k 0 c + (1 k 0 )d)k
;
k0

k 0 )d) = 0;

We …nesse this challenge by arguing that our evolved utility functions might well have
led to evolutionary suboptimality in the circumstances of the transition. That is, a tendency
to imitate and a concern with quality were embedded in utility by misperceptions that were
plausibly once prevalent. If these misperceptions were reduced at the time of the transition,
the result would be overimitation combined with an exaggerated concern with quality, thus
at once buttressing the approach of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) and that of Becker
and Lewis (1973).

6

Conclusions

Our motivating question was: Supposing, for the sake of argument, that we are intelligent
and rational, why is our evolved utility not simply o¤spring? We formulated a principalagent model in which both Nature and the individual observed two signals— one recurrent
and one transient— that bear on the …tness consequences of the agent’s choices. The agent,
however, has arbitrary beliefs about the implications of the signals. One abstract option
would be for Nature to explicitly and directly communicate her accurate beliefs to the agent,
who could then choose optimally by maximizing expected …tness in the light of these beliefs.
This option, however, is simply not a good description of humans, even though we are
presumably closer than any other species.
Alternatively, we consider the option that Nature shapes the utility function in the light
of the recurrent signal only. The individual then maximizes the expectation of this utility conditional on her arbitrary beliefs. We show, remarkably, that this option could also
generate optimal choice in the context of the model. That this method seems to be one in
evidence, despite the existence of a theoretically more direct way of achieving the same end,
may then have been harmless phylogenetic happenstance.
We showed that utility is a “whispering within” urging individuals to take actions that
re‡ect the evolutionary wisdom of a multitude of ancestors, in addition to accounting for local
on-the-spot information. The loudness of the whisper, or the force of the push delivered by
Nature, ultimately derives from the extent to which the individual’s beliefs were erroneous.
In vastly changed modern conditions the mechanism would no longer be evolutionarily
optimal. Indeed, if the individual now has fully accurate beliefs, modern decisions will be
distorted in accordance with the loudness of the whisper. In these circumstances, once utility
has arguments other than o¤spring, it will generate systematically biased choices, providing
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empirical content for the current theory.

7

Appendix

7.1

Proof of Lemma 1.

The function x (s; t) is characterized by the …rst-order conditions
Z

'xi (x (s; t); )f ( js; t)d = 0; for i = 1; :::; N:

Hence

X

Aij

j

@xj (s; t)
= bi for i = 1; :::; N;
@t

where
Aij =
The n

Z

'xi xj (x (s; t); )f ( js; t)d and bi =

Z

@f ( js; t)
d < 0.
@t

n matrix A is symmetric, negative de…nite, and has non-negative o¤-diagonal el-

ements. Hence

A is a Stieltjes matrix, which must have a symmetric and non-negative

inverse (see Varga, (1962, p. 85). Hence A
Since

2

it follows that

@xj (s;t)
@t

6
6
4

1

must be a symmetric and non-positive matrix.
3

@x1 (s;t)
@t

:::
@xN (s;t)
@t

7
7 = A 1 b;
5

0, for j = 1; :::; N: Further, since A

any row be entirely zero, and it must indeed be that
The proof that

7.2

'xi (x (s; t); )

@xj (s;t)
@s

@xj (s;t)
@t

1

is non-singular, it cannot have

> 0, for j = 1; :::; N:

> 0; for j = 1; :::; N is analogous.

Proof of Theorem 1

Select an arbitrary s: To simplify notation, we then drop the dependence of x ( ) and ( )
on s: De…ne, for all x and t,
V (x; t) = E ['(x; ) j t] + (x);
29

where the expectation is taken over

using the pdf g:

We wish to show that V (x (t); t) > V (x; t) for all t and all x 6= x (t):
Remark 1 Properties of V (x; t). For all i and all t:
1.
2.
3.

@
V
@xi
@
V
@xi
@
V
@xi

(xi ; x i ; t) is weakly increasing in x

i

for all xi :

(x; t) is strictly increasing in t for all x:
(x (t); t) = 0.

Proof. From the de…nitions of V ( ) and ( ) we obtain
@
V (x; t) = E 'xi (xi ; x i ; ) j t
@xi

E 'xi (x (ti (xi )); ) j ti (xi ) :

(3)

For property 1, note that the …rst term on the R.H.S. of (3) is weakly increasing in x
(since, by assumption,

@2
@xi @xj

'(x; )

0 for all x;

independent of x i :

i

and all i 6= j), and the second term is

For property 2, note that the …rst term on the R.H.S. of (3) is increasing in t (since,
by assumption,

@2
@xi @

'(x; ) > 0 for all x;

and all i; and the pdf g is increasing in t in

…rst-order stochastic dominance), and the second term is independent of t:
For property 3, note that ti (xi (t)) = t (by de…nition) and therefore
E 'xi (x (t); ) j t = E 'xi (x (ti (xi )); ) j ti (xi ) :

Now select an arbitrary t and an arbitrary x 6= x (t): Let

WLOG, that

minf 1 ; tg and

1

2
N +1

:::

maxf

N:

Also, select two numbers

N ; tg:

De…ne
M+ = fi : xi
M

xi (t)g ;

= fi : xi < xi (t)g :
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i

= ti (xi ) for all i: Assume,

0

and

N +1

such that

0

Note that
V (x _ x (t); t) =

X Z

V (x; t) +

n+1 ;tg

minf

n

n2M

d
V (xi
d

n(

); xi>n ; t)d ;

and

V (x (t); t) +

X Z

n2M+

V (x _ x (t); t) =

n

maxf

n 1 ;tg

d
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi
d

n(

); t)d ;

where M+n is de…ned as the set fi 2 M+ : i < ng :
It follows that

V (x (t); t)

V (x; t) =
n

maxf

n 1 ;tg

minf

n+1 ;tg

d
V (xi
d

n(

); xi>n ; t)d

d
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi
d

n(

); t)d :

n2M

X Z

n2M+

X Z

We begin by showing that V (x (t); t)

n

(4)

V (x; t); for which we proceed in two steps.

Step 1. We show that all terms in the …rst sum of (4) are nonnegative. Fix n 2 M :

For all

2(

n ; min f n+1 ; tg)

(a possibly empty interval) we have
d
V (xi
d

X @
V (xi
@xj
j n

X @
V (xi
@xj
j n

X @
V (xi
@x
j
j n
(Recall that

d
d

n(

n(

n(

n(

); xi>n ; t)

); xi>n (min f

); xi>n (min f

(5)

); xi>n ; t) =
d
x( )
d j

n+1 ; tg); t)

d
x( )
d j

n+1 ; tg); min f n+1 ; tg)

d
x ( ) > 0:
d j

xj ( ) > 0 for all j.)

The …rst weak inequality in (5) follows from property 1 of the remark: xi
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xi (min f

n+1 ; tg)

for all i > n implies
@
V (xi
@xj
@
V (xi
@xj

n(

n(

); xi>n ; t)

); xi>n (min f

n+1 ; tg); t)

for all j

n:

The second weak inequality in (5) follows from property 2 of the remark: t
implies
@
V (xi
@xj
@
V (xi
@xj

n(

n(

); xi>n (min f

); xi>n (min f

min f

n+1 ; tg

n+1 ; tg); t)

n+1 ; tg); min f n+1 ; tg)

for all j

n:

Finally, the strict inequality in (5) follows from combining all three properties of the
remark:

< min f

n+1 ; tg

implies xi ( ) < xi (min f

@
V (xi
@xj

n(

@
V (x ( ); min f
@xj

); xi>n (min f
n+1 ; tg)

>

n+1 ; tg)

for all i and therefore

n+1 ; tg); min f n+1 ; tg)

@
V (x ( ); ) = 0 for all j
@xj

n:

Step 2. We show that all terms in the second sum of (4) are nonpositive. Fix n 2 M+ :

Note that for all

2 (max f

n 1 ; tg ;

n)

(a possibly empty interval) we have

d
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi
d

n(

(6)

); t) =

X @
d
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi n ( ); t)
x( )
@xj
d j
j n
X @
d
V (xi<n (max f n 1 ; tg); xi n ( ); t)
x( )
@xj
d j
j n

X @
V (xi<n (max f
@x
j
j n

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

); max f

n 1 ; tg)

d
x ( ) < 0:
d j

The …rst weak inequality in (6) follows from property 1 of the remark: xi2M (t); xi2M+n
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xi<n (max f

n 1 ; tg)

implies
@
V (xi2M (t); xi2M+n ; xi
@xj

@
V (xi<n (max f
@xj

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

n(

); t)

); t) for all j

n:

The second weak inequality in (6) follows from property 2 of the remark: t

max f

implies
@
V (xi<n (max f
@xj
@
V (xi<n (max f
@xj

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

); max f

n 1 ; tg

); t)

n 1 ; tg)

for all j

n:

Finally, the strict inequality in (6) follows from combining all three properties of the
remark:

> max f

n 1 ; tg

implies xi ( ) > xi (max f

@
V (xi<n (max f
@xj
@
V (x ( ); max f
@xj

n 1 ; tg); xi n (

n 1 ; tg)

<

n 1 ; tg)

for all i and therefore

); max f

n 1 ; tg)

@
V (x ( ); ) = 0 for all j
@xj

n:

We now show that V (x (t); t) > V (x; t): Since x 6= x (t) there exists either an n 2 M

such that the interval (
(max f

n 1 ; tg ;

n)

n ; min f n+1 ; tg)

is nonempty, or an n 2 M+ such that the interval

is nonempty (or both). In the former case, it follows from step 1 above

that at least one of the integrals in the …rst sum of (4) is positive. In the latter case, it follows
from step 2 above that at least one of the integrals in the second sum of (4) is negative. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.

7.3

Proof of Lemma 3

As part of the inductive proof, we show that "xn is independent of "
n + 1; n + 2; ::; and for n = 1; 2; :::. At t = 1; it follows that

1

= t1

m

and "tm for m =

"t1 so it follows that the

optimal x1 = t1 : (Whenever …tness is quadratic, the evolutionarily optimal choice of x is the
mean of the distribution of :) Furthermore, it follows that w1
where x1

1

is independent of "

n

E(

1

x1 )2 = E("t1 )2 = u;

and "tn for n = 2; ::: . As the induction hypothesis,

suppose the result holds for n so that, in particular, "xn is independent of "
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m

and "tm for

m = n + 1; n + 2; ::: It follows that the posterior distribution of

n+1

given xn and tn+1 is

normal with mean given by
kn tn+1 + (1

kn )xn where kn =

v + wn
= k(u; v; wn );
u + v + wn

and variance given by
wn+1 = kn2 u + (1

kn )2 (v + wn ) =

u(v + wn )
= (wn );
u + v + wn

say. The optimal choice of xn+1 is then xn+1 = kn tn+1 + (1

kn )xn conditional on tn+1

and xn , given the quadratic …tness function.26 Now, completing part of the proof, we have
"xn+1 = xn+1
Then

0

n+1

is independent of "

(wn ) = (1

m

and "tm for m = n + 2; ::: .

2

kn ) 2 (0; 1). Also (0) =

uv
u+v

> 0 and (u) =

(u+v)u
2u+v

< u: It follows

that the di¤erence equation wn+1 = (wn ) generates monotonic convergence wn # w , as
n ! 1 from w1 = u to the unique w 2 (0; u) such that w = (w ):
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